Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

E. Halvorson, Inc., and The State Insurance Fund v.
Theodore L. Williams and The Industrial
Commission of Utah : Plaintiffs' Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Robert D. Moore; Attorney for Plaintiffs
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Halvorson v. Williams, No. 10743 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3899

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.

IN THE SUPREME~.;
OF THE STATEd.(·

___
,

.:~.~;~~,,·,.,·
__..,
-

,: ·'"' ~ "'··.

E. HALVORSON, INC., ~d ,· ),"' · )
THE STATE INSUB:AN~I~ ~. 1
FUND,

•

I

. ,. ·'"

-vs.-

PLA

W. C. LAMOREAUX
415 So. 2nd East
Salt Lake City, Utah ·
..
Attorney for T1',99tlo~ fi:~...
I . ¥.. ,

PHIL L. HANSEN

Attorney General
State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Uta.h
~.
Attorney for The Iu~: ~
of UtoJt,
.

c

•

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE........................................

1

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL......................................................

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................................

2

ARGUMENT

6

POINT I
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO REFER
THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL TO DETERMINE THE PERCENTAGE OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY AND TO THE PREVIOUSLY
EXISTING CONDITION ..............................................................

6

POINT II
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED............

10

POINT III
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ADOPTING THE
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT ON FILE HEREIN ................

12

CONCLUSION --------·······-·--·--·················-····································-·············
13
Cases Cited
Rockford v. Industrial Commission, 358 P. 2d 899, 11 U. 2d 312....

13

Marker v. Industrial Commission, 84 U. 587, 37 P. 2d 785............

12

The State Insurance Commission of Utah v. The Industrial
Commission of Utah, 395 P. 2d 541, 16 P. 2d 50........................

6

Statutes Cited
35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953 .................................................... 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13
a!i-1-77 U.C.A. 1953 ....................................................................................

12

U.C.A. 1953....................................................................................

10

~5-1-85

IN THE SUP·REME COURT
Of' THE STATE OF UTAH
K HALVORSON, INC., and
THlD STATE INSURANCE
FUND,
--vs.-

Plaintiffs,

TIUXrnORE L. vVILLIAMS,
arnl THE INDUSTRIAL
COM.l\IISSION OF UTAH

Case
No.10743

Defenda;nts.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was a proceeding under the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act wherein the defendant, Theodore L.
Williams, was awarded permanent total disability as
:lgainst the plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
rrhe Industrial Commission heard evidence on the
rlf't\.,11dant's rlaim and awarded against the plaintiffs
the maximum allowed for a permanent total disability.

1

RJ;~LIEF

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

This case is before this Court on a \Vrit of C0rtiorari. The p1aintiff seeks a reversal of the Order of the
Industrial Commission and a determination requiri11g
the Commission to have a medical panel appointed pursuant to the requirements of 35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Theodore L. \Villiams, on Odobt'r
13, 1964, vrns injured during the course of his employment with Halvorson Construction Co. The defernlant
experienced a 20-foot fall which resulted in a bilateral
ankle fracture, as well as a fracture of the lumbar Ycrtebrae. (T12) Subsequent to the defendant's admissio11
to the hospital, the defendant experienced extreme cardial vascular insufficiency. It was supposed that he snffered from an acute myrocardial infarction. (T2) 'I'he
plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, paid the defernlant 's hospitalization and medical bi11s, and on Octolwr
15, 1965, an application was filed for a physical examination by the Medical Advisory Board. (T22) On November 20, 1965, the defendant, Theodore L. \Villiam~.
appeared before the Meclica1 Ackisonr Board to <lrtt>rmine the permanent disability caused by 1111• injnr~- of
October 13, 1964. The Board found 50% loss of ho<lil~
function due to muscu1ar-ske1etal injnries. Hmw·,·er. ii
did not make a finding as to permanent disability rati1w
in regard to the defendant's cardiac and pulrnorn1r.1
status and its relationship to tlw accid011t. (T 27)
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On December 3, 1965, the Commission notified Mr.
Williams that The State Insurance Fund was liable for
permanent disability amounting to 50% loss of bodily
fnndion arnl informed him that a special board would
Ji(• appointed by the Commission to evaluate the cardiac
<1Jl(1 pulmonary problems. Dr. Vikel, chairman of the
m·wl:-T designated panel, asked Dr. F. Clyde Null, a treati11~ pl1ysician, to evaluate for the panel the medical as1wcts of the ease in regard to the heart, lung and kidney.
Pursuant to said request, Dr. Null filed a report (T 35-39,
i11elnsive) wherein he concluded that the patient's pulmonary disease is unrelated to the ankle injury and anteilatcd the accident and the recent period of hospitalization. (T39) The doctor also noted in his report that the
patie11t had similar chest pains in 1955, and was treated
hy the Veterans Administration Hospital for bronchitis.
On February 1, 1966, the panel filed its report (T41).
The medical panel, after reviewing the history of
the clef endant, Williams, made a finding that the myroeardial infarction plus the kidney difficulties were causall~r related to the accident in question. They stated that
~Ir. vYilliams had had a long standing chronic obstruct iY0 airway disease and emphysema. The panel made the
following statement:
''The panel finds that Mr. Williams has severe,
C'hronic pulmonary disease which in itself would
he sufficient reason for total and permanent disahilitv. To this is added, the panel finds, chronic
C'Hr(iiac disease as evidenced by angina which
would be a 10%-20% additional cause of disabilit~r. These disabilities from pulmonary and cardiac diseases are, of course, in addition to his
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orthopedic disabilities which have been previously rated by the Medical Advisory Board.''
Thus, the medical panel found that the defendant
had a long-standing pre-existing problem; further, that
the accident precipitated certain events which would
make the pulmonary disease, standing by itself, totally
and permanently disabling. Then the panel added 10%20% additional disability. Within the time provided,
The State Insurance Fund objected to the medical panrl
report and stated in its objection that the same was mad0
"for the purpose of clarification of permanent partial
disability relating specifically to the industrial accidrnt
of October 13, 1964." (T66) The position of The Rtatr
Insurance Fund was further amplified in a subsequrllt
letter dated March 10, 1966, wherein The State Insurance Fund stated that the amount assigned appeared io
be an additional 10% - 20% and wanted a clarification
as to its liability. This confusion was felt by the defendant's attorney in his letter of April 13, 1966, wherein he
wrote requesting a hearing so that the applicant may
be found 100% totally and permanently disabled. (Ti2)
At the onset of the hearing, the plaintiff clearly state(]
the dilemma with which it was faced in determining the
rating the panel has assigned. (T76-77)
Dr. Crockett testified at the hearing on .T Ull(' rn.
1966, on behalf of the medical panel. The doctor testified in substance as follows: The defondant-applicallt
had been under treatment for angina pains and for pulmonary problems and chronic bronchitis at the Vrkr
ans Administration prior to thr acci<1cnt in qucstio11.
4-

Th(' panel did not make a determination as to the per-

(·<•11tage of disability attributable to the pre-existing
disease and further stated that they had insufficient information on "'hich to arrive at the determination of the
pnlrnonar:v disability prior to the injury. It was admit tc>d, however, that the defendant had a serious pre('Xisting condition. The medical history of the defend:rnt-applicant showed that disability rating had been
assigi1Crl by the Veterans Administration as a result of
the prior condition; however, the panel was unsure what
snid rating was. On cross-examination the doctor stated
that he did not have an opinion as to the defendant's disnhility prior to the accident in question and could not
<'Hll state whether or not it was less or more than 5%. It
was explained that the medical panel's report which statP<1 that the applicant was 10% - 20% additionally disaliled was in addition to his pulmonary problem which
renderPd him, in and of itself, permanently disabled. It
was admitted that the panel report in regard to percentagt> of disability was ambiguous and that it was the doctor's hope that the same could be clarified at the time of
the hearing.
After the hearing, the plaintiffs objected to the procedure followed by the Industrial Commission. The plaintiffs specifically asked that this matter be referred to
n rni,cliral panel pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-69
F< '.A. 195B, as amended, and stated in its Motion that
llw plaintiffs could not understand the position of the
medirnl panel until the same was clarified by Dr. CrockPtt. Notwithstanding the above, the Commission made
<111 Ord<>r dated August 11, 1966, which assessed liability
5

for 100% disability to the plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, and stated that the plaintiff had been misled as to the effect of Section 35-1-69 U.C.A. Hl53, as
amended. The plaintiff filed a Motion for Review and
set forth six bases as to why the Commission acted without authority of law in not complying with the above
mentioned statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING
TO REFER THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL TO DETERMINE THE PERCENTAGE OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL
IMPAIRMENT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE
INDUSTRIAL INJURY AND TO THE PRE
VIOUSLY EXISTING CONDITION.
The issues presented by this appeal does not involve the question of whether or not the Industrial Commission acted arbitrary and capricious in making its
:findings. For the purpose of this argument the def emlant
does not object to the :finding of the Commission that the
defendant-applicant is 100% totally and permanently disabled. The issues presented her2 are whether or not
the Commission erred in failing to comply with Section
35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, under the circumstances
of this case. It is fundamental, and this Court has stated,
that the Commission's decision will he reversed if said
decision is based upon a misapplication of law. '!'hr
State Insurance Com111iss1:on of Utah v. The Ii11l11sl rial
Commission of Utah, 395 P. 2d 541, 16 U. 2d 50. lt i:.;
elementary that on review this Court "-ill not distnrli

disputed findings of faet made by the Commission, but
will re;'iew errors of law.
It seems clear that in this case, Section 35-1-69

U.C.A. l 953, as amended, applies. This statute pro\'ides that if an employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity prior to the accidental injury, which results in permanent incapacity
which is greater than he would have had if the pre-existing incapacity was not present, he shall be awarded benefitR hased upon the combined injuries; however, ''the liability of the employer for such compensation and medical
care shall be for the industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid out of the special fund ... " If
the above circumstances exist, then the statute specifi1.:ally requires that the matter be sent to a medical panel,
which must make three determinations:
1. The total permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions, including the industrial injury (which was accomplished by the medical
panel report). ( T41)

2. 'rhe percentage of permanent physical impairm<>nt nttributable to the industrial injury. (This was not
aceomplished by the medical panel.)
3. 'fhe percentage of permanent physical impairment
a1 trihutable to the previously existing conditions, wheth('\' dnc to accidental injury, disease or congenital causes.
( Tl1t• mt>dical panel admittedly did not examine into this
'J lll':-;1 ion.)
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There is no doubt that Mr. Williams had a longstanding history of pulmonary problems which precipitated a disability rating by the Veterans Administration.
The panel report is admittedly ambiguous, which
fact is evidenced by the plaintiff's attorney's letter,
the doctor's statement, the hearing examiner's statement and by an examination of the report. After the
matter was "clarified" at the hearing in question, the
plaintiff timely requested The Industrial Commission
to comply with 35-1-69, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
There can be no reasonable basis on which to deny
the plaintiff the right to the appointment of a medical
panel to determine the percentage of disability attributable to the pre-existing condition and to assess the liability for such disability to the special fund. Dr. Kilpatrick testified in this matter in regard to the pre-existing condition and states as follows: (TSO)
'' Q. But there is no doubt there was a serious
pre-existing condition 1

A. There is no doubt about that.

Q. Can you describe the condition that he had
prior to the injury, to the best of your recollection 1
A. He had emphysema and chronic bronchitis.

Q. And what do you mean by 'emphysema'7
A. This is an over-distention of the little alveoli, or the little compartments of the lung'. ~o
that the lung is larger than normal, and the air
can't get in and out as readily as the normal lnug.
Q. At this type of condition - I think it is a
condition, rather than a disemw, isn't it?
8

A. It's a disease.

Q. It's a disease7
A. Yes, sir.
Q.
effect
A.
affect

This type of disease can have a material
on the heart, can it not 1
Yes. After it gets severe enough, it can
the heart.

Q. And generally isn't this disease a developing type of situation?
A. Over many years.''
It is clear that the 100% rating was based not only
on the accident but upon the pre-existing condition, according to the doctor's testimony. (T 81-82)

'' Q. In other words your 10 to 20% was taken
into consideration as if he would not have had
this pre-existing condition?
A. Correct.
Q. With the pre-existing condition, he was
100%7
Q. With the pre-existing condition, in the
condition of his lungs at the time that we examined him - or we saw him, and went over his records - he was 100% disabled pulmonary wise."

It is also clear from the record that the medical
panel was not instructed of, nor did it determine, the perrentage of disability due to the pre-existing condition,
as follows: (T88)

"Q. WonJCT it be a fair statement to say that
yon had insufficient evidence then to arrive at a
<lisability evaluation prior to his injury7
A. That is correct. I had no evidence for disability prior to his injury.
9

Q. But you kne1v there was some?

A. I knew that he had pulmonary emphysema
and chronic bronchitis, due to his history. Due to
the Veterans' Hospital records."
POINT II
THE COl\HIISSION ERRED IN ITS INTF,R_
PRETATION AND DESCRIPTION OF 'rHE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 35-1-69 U.C.A.
1953, AS AMENDED.
The Commission's Order on file herein does llot
comply with 35-1-85 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, in setting
forth :findings of fact and conclusions of law. Howen~r,
it appears clear that the Commission held that Sectio11
35-1-69 U.C.A., as amended, does not apply to this particular case. The Commission's reasoning, it is respectfully suggested, is clearly erroneous. The Order state~
that the section in question was substantially changed in
the year 1965. This is not the fact of the matter. Thr
section was, however, substantially changed by the l96:l
Legislature. Prior thereto, the statute in question spoke
about an employee being "permanently partially disabled." This wording has been replaced by the phrase
"permanent incapacity." Also, the second paragrapl1
of the existing statute was added, which provided for a
determination of certain facts by a medical panel. It i~
agreed that the Commission's statement, that the amendment has the effect of relieving the employer from a~
suming liability for an injury aggravated by pre-existing
disabilities and, as amended, the special fund is liah1r
for tlw percentage of permanent incapacity attrilrntahlr
10

to the pre-existing condition, is correct. Prior to the 1963
mnen<lment, the "special fund" was only liable when
tl1rre was a previous permanent partial disability. The
phrase "permanent partial disability" is used in the
Workmen's Compensation Act in those situations where
a rating has occurred. Thus, the legislative amendment,
hy :mbstituting the phrase'' a permanent incapacity by aeeid<·ntal injury, disease or congenital cases" clearly
men ns that the second injury or the "special fund" is
liable for that percentage of physical impairment attributed to such previously existing accidental injury,
di:wnse or congenital causes. In light of the addition of
thr requirements of a special medical panel to determine
tl1r percentage of disability, it is apparent that it is the
<lnty of the Industrial Commission to instruct the medic·11 I 1rnnel to arrive at such percentage. The only amendment in 1965 was the dollar amount, increasing the same
from $735 to $830 for rehabilitation.
Initially, the Commission held that 35-1-69 U.C.A.
1!1:>:1, as amended, was not applicable because the in-

jnry occurred on October 13, 1965, and the effective date
of the legislation was July, 1965. The Commission, subS<·quent thereto, amended its Order and found that the
injnry O<'cnrrecl on October 13, 1964. One is at a loss
to tlrtermine what the Commission meant when it ref'1'l'l'<><l to the fact that the statute is not applicable be<«111:-;e there would be retroactive legislation and it
would he unconstitutional. If the Commission was reh·rring- to the injury of October 13, 1964, the Comr11i,:-:io11 i:-; mistaken in its assumption that the amend•111·11t occurred in 1965. In fact, as stated above, the
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amendment was passed in 1963. Therefore, under thi:;
theory, the section is dearly applicahle. If, howeYer,
the Commission's Order may be construed to hold that
"permanent incapacity" must have occurred prior to
the effective date of the legislation, it is respectfully
urged that the Commission has misinterpreted the dear
legislative intent of the statute. For the Legislature, in
stating ''one who has previously incurred permanent incapacity," sets no limits as to time. This question lm
been decided in Utah in Marker v. Industrial Commis.
sion, 84 U. 587, 37 P. 2d 785. This case involved a situation where an employee had previously incurred permanent partial disability prior to the enactment of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and, pursuant to the sprcial injury fund, brought an action for combined injuries. The defense raised was that the permanent
partial disability must have occurred subsequent to thr
enactment of the statute. The Court held that the Legislature, in imposing no limitation or condition as tn
time or place of the occurring of the previous disability,
clearly meant that the prior disability must not have
occurred subsequent to the enactment of the statute.

POINT III
THE COl\fMISSION ERRED IN ADOPTING
THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT ON FILE
HEREIN.
Subsequent to the filing of the medical panel report, the plaintiff, pursuant to 35-1-77, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, objected to said report. Once written ohjertions are so fik•d, acco]'(ling- to the statute, npon a hear-
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ing '' ... the written report of the panel may be received
as an exhibit but shall not be considered as evidence in
the case, except insofar as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.''
Since the panel report was ambiguous and the same
nreded clarification by the doctor's further testimony,
the same could not be the basis for an award since the
testimony of Dr. Crockett did not sustain the medical
panel report but rather by amplifying the same changed
tlw meaning of the report. See Hackford v. Industrial
Commission, 358 P. 2d 899, 11U.2d312.
CONCLUSION
The Commission erred in failing to provide that
the medical panel should assess the permanent incapat'i ty of the defendant and charge the same to the special fund pursuant to 35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MOORE
422 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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